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Hazard evaluations, also called process hazard analysis (PHAs) have been performed formally in 
gradually improving fashion for more than five decades.  Methods such as HAZOP and What-If+ 
Analysis have been developed and honed during this time.  But, one weakness identified 25 
years ago still exists in the majority of PHAs performed around the world.  Most PHAs do not 
thoroughly analyze the errors that can occur during startup, shutdown, and other non-routine 
(non-normal) modes of operations; sadly the commonly used approaches for PHA of continuous 
mode of operation only find about 5 - 10% of the accident scenarios that may occur during 
startup, shutdown, and online maintenance.  This is despite the fact that about 70% of major 
accidents occur during non-routine operations.  Instead of focusing on the most hazardous modes 
of operation, most PHAs focus on normal operations (e.g., HAZOP of equipment nodes).  In a 
majority (perhaps more than 80%) of both older operations and new plants/projects, the non-
routine modes of operations are not analyzed at all.  This means that perhaps 70% of the accident 
scenarios during non-routine operations are being missed by those PHAs.  If the hazard 
evaluation does not find the scenarios that can likely occur during these non-routine 




Chapter 9 of “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation”, 3rd Ed, 2008, AIChE/CCPS requires hazard 
evaluations of all hazards of the process during all modes of operation.  The US OSHA PSM 
regulation requires PHA of all hazards during all modes of operation as well, and several key 
citations since 1990 have focused on PHA of non-normal modes.  US CSB and other agencies 
have also recognized this weakness in PHAs.    
 
This paper explains the business case for doing PHAs of procedure steps for non-routine modes 
of operation, while also describing the growing regulatory pressure from US OSHA and others.  
The paper recaps the practical ways to efficiently and thoroughly analyze the step-by-step 
procedures that are used to control non-routine operating modes, as well as those for batch and 
between batch operations.  This paper builds upon the methods and rules provided in papers 
beginning in 1993 and builds upon the CCPS textbook just cited.   The reader will be able to use 
the results of this paper to estimate the number of accident scenarios they may be missing and to 
estimate the time it would take to complete an efficient and thorough PHA of the non-routine 
modes of operation.  The reader will also be able to alert their management to the growing 


































During the period 1970 to 1989, 60% to 75% of major accidents in continuous processes 
occurred during non-routine modes of operation (principally startup and online maintenance 
modes).1  This trend has continued unabated for most of the process industry to the present day.  
A compilation of 47 major process safety accidents from 1987 to 2010 was provided in an earlier 
paper on this topic (Bridges, et al) 2; of these, 69% occurred during non-routine operations.  In 
addition, a poll of over 50 clients indicates that 70% of their moderate and major accidents 
occurred during non-routine modes of operation.  This data is particularly disturbing when 
factoring in the time at risk, since most continuous processes are typically shut down 5% or less 
per year.  Therefore, for many continuous processes the workers and other stakeholders are 30 to 
50 times more likely to have a major accident during the time frame of startup, shutdown, or on-





















Figure 1:   Distribution by Operating Mode of the 47 Largest Process Safety Accidents 
between 1987 and 20102 (Appendix A) 
 
One reason for processes being at higher risk during these operating modes is many of the 
safeguards (independent protection layers; IPLs) are bypassed or may not be fully capable in 
these modes.  A hazard evaluation is necessary to help a company identify the layers of 
protection necessary to lower the risk to acceptable levels.  To fulfill this need, a company 
operating a continuous process should fully evaluate the hazards during all modes of operation.  
Unfortunately, in the first four decades of hazard evaluation use (beginning after the Flixborough 
disaster in the UK in 1974 – another accident that occurred during startup in a temporary 
configuration), many companies have done a poor job of identifying and evaluating accident 
scenarios during startup, shutdown, and online maintenance modes of operation, while usually 








operation.   
 
INCREASING REGULATORY PRESSURE 
 
Industry has taken some initiatives on resolving this problem.  One initiative was to improve the 
focus on PHA of non-routine procedures in “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation”, 3rd Ed, 2008, 
AIChE/CCPS3.  A new Chapter 9, Section 1 was added that necessitates hazard evaluations of all 
hazards of the process during all modes of operation.  This textbook also explained why, when, 
and how to perform such analysis of step-by-step procedures.   
 
Many companies have taken the initiatives to do the same, including about 20% of the largest 
chemical, petrochemical, and refining companies.  But, the vast majority of companies who 
should be analyzing step-by-step deviations are not; and the major accidents continue to occur 
partly because of this.  As a result, the US regulators are beginning to bring more pressure for the 
regulated companies to do a PHA of All modes of operation. 
 
US OSHA Regulation and Enforcement: 
 
The US OSHA PSM regulation requires PHA of all hazards during all modes of operation as 
well, and several key citations since 1990 have focused on PHA of non-normal modes.  
 
• Before there was a PSM regulation from US OSHA, the Agency published CPL 2-
2.45 (Systems Safety Evaluation of Operations with Catastrophic Potential)4.  In this guidance 
document, OSHA stated that a human error analysis should address: 
o Consequences of failure to perform a task. 
o Consequences of incorrect performance of a task. 
o Procedures and controls to minimize errors.4 
 
This approach is still the fundamental analysis method for PHA of non-normal modes of 
operation. 
 
• Phillips 66 “PHA” Citation – A citation with 566 instances was issued to Phillips 66 
in Pasadena, TX, following their 1989 disaster that killed 23 workers.5  The citation was 
related to a violation of the General Duty Clause (Section 5(a)(1) of OSH Act of 1970).  US 
OSHA cited Phillips against the General Duty Clause, since the PSM standard (29 CFR 
1910.119) had not yet been issued.  OSHA cited Phillips for not protecting its workers from 
hazards of fire/explosion by, among others, not performing a PHA that should have included an 
evaluation of the effect of design modifications on operator performance, and the identification 
of the source of observed human error and the identification of human factors that could result in 
incident event sequences.  The citation stated, “This review should result in a systematic 
listing of the (1) types of errors likely to be encountered during normal or emergency 
operation, (2) factors contributing to such errors, and (3) proposed system modifications to 
reduce the likelihood of such errors”.  
 
The settlement agreement25 between US OSHA and Phillips included the following requirements 
for process hazard analyses (PHAs) of the rebuilt and surviving units: 
 
o    “Phillips will analyze each process…and will include human factors analysis … [and] 
will be …led by an independent consultant.”   
 William Bridges (of JBF Associates at the time, now with PII) led these PHAs.  Before 
these PHAs began, OSHA, Phillips, and Mr. Bridges decided that the best approach for finding 
all human error scenarios was to perform a HAZOP of deviations of the steps for the procedures 
governing activities for startup, shutdown, and particularly online maintenance.   
o    “Phillips will provide OSHA an independent consultant’s evaluation of the adequacy of 
its settling leg maintenance procedures performed while the polyethylene reactors are in 
operation…” 
 As part of the settlement to meet this requirement, it was decided by JBFA, Phillips and 
OSHA to perform a Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) of the Setting Leg online maintenance 
procedure, to ensure that the statistical risk of the accident recurring is less than the background 
risk of driving to work.  
The PHA and HRA resulting from the Phillips settlement agreement is presented as a Case Study 
later in this paper for sake of clarity. 
 
• Paragraph (e) of the US OSHA regulation on PSM, 29 CFR 1910.119,6 and similar 
requirements in US EPA's rule for risk management programs (RMP), 40 CFR 68.24,7 
specifically require that PHAs consider and address hazards of the process, i.e., all hazards 
regardless of the mode of operation (routine or non-routine).  
o 29 CFR 1910.119(e)(1) states that the PHA, “shall identify, evaluate, and control the 
hazards involved in the process” 
o 29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(i) states that the process hazard analysis shall address “The 
hazards of the process”. 
o 29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(vi) states that the process hazard analysis shall address human 
factors. 
o Appendix C to the OSHA PSM standard states that both routine and non-routine 
activities need to be addressed by the PHA of the covered process. 
 
There is no qualifier that limits the OSHA PHA requirement to only routine modes of operation.  
PSM requires that all hazards related to the process be addressed, regardless of the mode of 
operation or activity (routine or non-routine). 
 
• OSHA Inspection No. 103490306 (Nov 2, 1992).8  In the first major PSM inspection in 
1992 using 29 CFR 1910.119, OSHA assessed a serious violation when the PHAs did not 
address "human factors such as board operator error, line breaking mistakes, and improper 
lockout and isolation of process equipment," all of which are errors originating from failure to 
either perform tasks or perform them correctly. 
 
• US OSHA published an internal document on Program Quality Verification of 
Process Hazard Analysis in 1993 (by Henry Woodcock, of OSHA).9  This document states 
that a PHA should include analysis of the "procedures for the operation and support functions" 
and goes on to define a "procedure analysis" as evaluating the risk of “skipping steps and 
performing steps wrong.”  The authors concur and PII has found the same true in PHAs that we 
have performed using various methods; a 2 Guideword HAZOP approach is normally optimal 
for PHA of procedures. 
 
 
• OSHA Inspection No. 123807828 (Nov 18, 1993)10 – Ashland Oil, Catlettsburg, KY.  
Several operators were preparing to ignite a 2-B-3 crude heater after a two week turnaround.  
The lead operator had two very inexperienced workers helping him light the heater.  …A large 
concentration of fuel gas was allowed to enter the heater before the pilot light was ignited.  The 
resulting explosion killed one employee, who received fatal injuries to the back of his head.  The 
operators bypassed safety shutdown features and did not do a visual check of the emergency 
shutdown system to ensure that the features were closed.  In addition, they did not check the 
firebox to ensure that it was gas-free before lighting the heater.    
 
The Kentucky OSHA citation read:  Company (Ashland Oil, KY) did not address all hazards of 
the process; they did not evaluate hazards during non-routine procedures such as startup, 
shutdown, emergency shutdown, and emergency operations.  Specifically, the company did not 
perform a PHA of the task of lighting the fired furnace. 
 
Settlement:  All procedures were re-written and all PHAs were redone to include a PHA of 
deviations from procedure steps. 
 
• Recent US OSHA PSM National Emphasis Programs for Chemical Processes11 and 
also for Refineries12 underscore the need for companies to identify potential accident scenarios 
during non-routine modes, and to reduce the frequency and consequences of such errors as part 
of an overall process safety management (PSM) program.   
 
 
OSHA recognizes that CCPS/AIChE has added as Chapter 9.1 in the 3rd edition of Guidelines for 
Hazard Evaluation (2008)3 to further emphasize the need for a PHA to include hazard 
evaluations of all modes of operation and that this chapter has added best-practice detail on the 
approach for doing the hazard evaluation of startup, shutdown, and online maintenance modes of 
operation.  Despite the specific OSHA standard that requires PHAs of covered processes must 
address all hazards, many PHAs still do not address hazards during all modes of operation.   
Further, many of the regulated community have stated “Well, OSHA did not tell us to perform a 
PHA of procedures for non-routine modes of operation.”  On the other-hand, OSHA did not state 
to do only a hazard evaluation of normal mode of operation and stop there.  
 
To highlight the importance that PHAs address hazards during all modes of operation and 
activities (routine and non-routine), OSHA is considering issuing a Hazard Alert that would 
incorporate the concepts in Chapter 9.1 of Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2008, 
CCPS/AIChE.3  Also, as stated above, OSHA has an enforcement initiative, CHEM NEP, that 
utilizes a list of dynamic questions that OSHA compliance officers use to evaluate compliance at 
facilities covered by the program.  It is possible that future dynamic list questions could address 







Pressure from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (US CSB) 
 
The CSB has commented on the need for PHAs to address all hazards of the process during all 
modes of operation.  Their clearest statement was in the report 2008-08-I-WV-R113 on the Bayer 
CropScience accident in Institute, WV, 2008.  In that report, CSB asks Bayer to: 
 
• Revise the corporate PHA policies and procedures to require: 
a. Validation of all PHA assumptions to ensure that risk analysis of each PHA scenario 
specifically examines the risk(s) of intentional bypassing or other nullifications of safeguards, 
b. Addressing all phases of operation and special topics including those cited in 
chapter 9 of “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures” (CCPS, 2008), 
c. Training all PHA facilitators on the revised policies and procedures prior to assigning the 
facilitator to a PHA team, and 
d. Ensure all PHAs are updated to conform to the revised procedures. 
 
US EPA’s RMP Regulation 
 
In the Risk Management Program rule (40 CFR 68.24)7 EPA also recognizes the importance of 
procedural analysis, by defining the purpose of a PHA to "examine, in a systematic, step-by-
step way, the equipment, systems, and procedures (emphasis added) for handling regulated 
substances." 
 
A well-done PHA should identify all failure scenarios that could lead to significant exposure of 
workers, the public, or the environment…….For toxics under PSM, however, you may plan to 
address a loss of containment by venting toxic vapors to the outside air.  In each circumstance, a 
PHA should define how the loss of containment could occur.  However, for EPA, the PHA team 
should reassess venting as an appropriate mitigation measure.  (From EPA RMP Guidance, 
Chapter 7, pgs 7-6 & 7-7; General Risk Management Program Guidance.26) 
 
Example of Local Regulation:  Contra Costa County Hazard Materials Program 
 
The counties in California are the implementation and enforcement agencies for the US EPA 
RMP regulation, which in California is termed, California Accidental Release Prevention 
(CalARP) regulations.  One premier implementer is Contra Costa County (CCC).  In addition to 
the standard requirements found in EPA’s RMP regulation (which has requirements essentially 
identical to OSHA PSM), CCHMP has also added their own initiatives to improve how the 10 
major facilities in CCC address human factors and PHAs of all modes of operation.  The 
Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO)14 specifically requires that each site perform a PHA of 
procedures, just be certain PHAs of all modes of operation are performed.  One question in the 
county’s auditing protocol is: 
 
• Did the Stationary Source perform Procedural PHAs to evaluate potential active failures 
or unsafe acts in the procedure such as missed or out of sequence steps and including raising 
questions regarding the availability of personnel to perform a task as specified in the procedure?  
[Section B: Chapter 4.3 of the CCHMP Safety Program Guidance Document] 
 
 
Conclusions on Regulatory Pressure 
 
Clearly, the regulatory pressure is increasing for industry to perform a PHA that thoroughly 
addresses hazards during all modes of operation, including deviations from steps in startup, 
shutdown, and online maintenance procedures. 
 
By the way, a similar focus is underway by the same government entities listed above to improve 
the coverage of all damage mechanism (corrosion, erosion, external impact, etc.) within a PHA.  
(such as CalOSHA’s proposed rule for refineries).  The 2008 update to the book Guidelines for 
Hazard Evaluation Procedures3 was also to address weaknesses observed (across the industry) 
by US CSB (and others) in coverage of damage mechanisms within PHAs; US CSB requested 
these changes from CCPS. 
 
 
PHA of NON-ROUTINE MODES OF OPERATION  
 
How does someone responsible for coordinating or performing hazard evaluations 
(including PHAs) uncover potentially important accident scenarios during all modes of 
operation without consuming too many resources?  To correctly answer this question, we 
must (1) understand the root causes of human error and (2) develop a strategy for systematically 
finding the scenarios that are caused by human error, during all modes of operation.  The strategy 
must be thorough, yet provide for a practical allocation of resources.  This paper provides a 
strategy that uses widely accepted hazard evaluation techniques (such as those referenced by 
OSHA and EPA for PHAs, which include what-if analysis and hazard and operability [HAZOP] 
analysis).  This strategy has proven effective for hundreds of facilities over the past two decades 
since it was first published.15  In addition to identifying accident scenarios during non-routine 
modes; this approach helps to more fully address human factors, which is a specific requirement 
of OSHA's PSM regulations and EPA's RMP rule.   
 
Human factor deficiencies can make operations during non-routine modes extremely hazardous – 
since operators generally have less operating experience for non-routine modes, and these types 
of operations rely heavily on operator decision-making and tasks.  In addition, there are usually 
less layers of protection in effect during non-routine operations.  Analyzing procedure steps can 
identify steps where the operator is most likely to make mistakes and suggest ways to reduce risk 
of an accident scenario, ranging from adding hardware to improving management systems. 
 
The approach outlined in this work applies equally to any hazard evaluation where the steps for a 
non-routine mode of operation are well defined (i.e., written), including PHAs of existing units, 
hazard evaluations during preliminary and detailed design phases of projects (for new/revised 
processes), and large or small management-of-change hazard reviews. 
 
What are Human Factors? 
 
Human error in research, design, construction, installation, operation, maintenance, 
manufacturing, inspection, management, etc., can be considered the cause of almost all industrial 
accidents.  (Experts typically quote that about 85% of accidents are caused by human error, 
 
though some say that except for natural disasters this figure is 100%.)  However, simply 
attributing these incidents to "human error" without evaluating the root cause implies that the 
errors are inevitable, unforeseeable, and uncontrollable.  Nothing could be further from the truth. 
 
Human errors are sometimes mistakenly called procedural errors.  This is not true anymore than 
saying all equipment errors are due to design errors.  People make mistakes for many reasons, 
but PII estimates that only about 10% of accidents due to human errors in the workplace occur 
because of personal influences, such as emotional state, health, or carelessness; most human 
error is due to weaknesses in the control of human factors.  Over the past five decades of 
industry research and observation in the workplace on human error, we have come to know that 
human error probability depends on many factors.   
 
These factors (described in more detail in Human Factors Missing from PSM 16), include those 
shown below (note that the percentages shown below were developed by PII after analysis of 
more than 15,000 process safety, safety, and operational incidents): 
 
• Procedure accuracy and clarity (the number one, most cited root cause of accidents): 
o A procedure typically needs to be 95% or better accuracy to help reduce human error; 
humans tend to compensate for the remaining 5% of errors in a written procedure. 
o A procedure must clearly convey the information (there are about 25 rules for structuring 
procedures to accomplish this) and the procedure  should be convenient to use. 
o Checklist features – These should be used and enforced either in the procedure or in a 
supplemental document. 
 
• Training, knowledge, and skills 
o Employees should be selected with the necessary skills before being hired or assigned to 
a department. 
o Initial Training – There must be effective training. The initial training should be 
demonstration-based training on each proactive task and each reactive (e.g., response to alarm) 
task. 
o Ongoing validation of human action is  needed and usually  should be repeated (in either 
actual performance or in drills/practice) at least once per year (as discussed later in this paper).  
For human IPLs, the action  should be demonstrated to be “fast enough” as well. 
o Documentation – the human performance should be documented and retained to 
demonstrate the error rates chosen are valid. 
 
• Fitness for Duty – Includes control of many sub-factors such as fatigue (a factor in a great 
many accidents), stress, illness and medications, and substance abuse. 
 
• Workload management – Too little workload and the mind becomes bored and looks for 
distraction; too many tasks per hour can increase human error as well. 
 
• Communication – Miscommunication (of an instruction or set of instructions or of the 
status of a process) is the second or third most common cause of human error in the workplace.  
There are proven management systems for controlling communication errors. 
 
 
• Work environment – Factors to optimize include lighting, noise, temperature, humidity, 
ventilation, and distractions. 
 
• Human System Interface – Factors to control include layout of equipment, displays, 
controls and their integration to displays, alarm nature and control of alarm overload, labeling, 
color-coding, fool-proofing measures, etc. 
 
• Task complexity – Complexity of a task or job is proportional to the (1) number of 
choices available for making a wrong selection of similar items (such as number of similar 
switches, number of similar valves, number of similar size and shaped cans), (2) number of 
parallel tasks that may distract the worker from the task at hand (leading to either an initiating 
event or failure of a protection layer), (3) number of individuals involved in the task, and (4) 
judgment or calculation/interpolation, if required.  For most chemical process environments, the 
complexity of the task is relatively low (one action per step), but for response actions (human 
IPLs) there are almost always other tasks underway when the out-of-bounds reading occurs or 
the alarm is activated. 
 
In addition to the human factors listed, other considerations for use of a human as an IPL include 
(1) time available to perform the action and (2) physical capability to perform the action. 
 
Other papers provide much more detail on each human factor and the relative weighting of 
each.16, 17, 18 
 
These human-error causes (human factors), which in turn result from other human errors, are all 
directly within management's control.  When using human error data for controlling initiating 
events (IEs) and independent protection layers (IPLs), the site should ensure that the factors 
above are consistently controlled over the long-term and that they are controlled to the same 
degree during the mode of operation that the PHA, HAZOP, What-if, FMEA, or LOPA covers.  
For instance, if the workers are fatigued following many extra hours of work in a two week 
period leading up to restart of a process, then the human error rates can increase by a factor of 10 
times or 20 times during startup.19 
 
Overview of Methodology for Hazard Evaluation of Non-Routine Modes of Operation 
 
The hazard evaluation of non-routine modes of operation involves reviewing procedures using a 
HAZOP, simplified HAZOP, or What-if analysis to uncover potential accident scenarios 
associated with non-routine operations, for continuous or batch operations.  As mentioned 
earlier, human error is more likely and more critical during non-routine operations.  By analyzing 
procedural steps where human error is more likely, and where human error or component failure 
could lead to a consequence of interest, risk can be reduced. The hazard evaluation team 
objective is to evaluate the risk associated with skipping steps and performing steps wrong.   
 
FMEA cannot be applied to procedure-based deviations, unless you create a “human” 
component, in which case you have simply merged HAZOP deviations for “steps” into FMEA.  
Pre-Hazard Analysis (PrHA) and other hazard evaluation methods are not applicable for 
accomplishing a detailed hazard evaluation of non-routine modes of operations. 
 
Checklist of human factors issues (see an earlier paper15 and also in the Guidelines for Hazard 
Evaluation Procedures3) can be very useful after the detailed hazard evaluation of deviations of 
steps.  Such analysis can indicate where generic weaknesses exist that can make errors during 
any mode of operation more likely, or that can make errors during maintenance more likely.  
Such human factors checklists are normally used at the end of the analysis, they can be done 
piecemeal during an analysis (on breaks from the meetings) by individuals on the team, and then 
the results of each individual review can be discussed as a team at the end. 
 
As with scenarios uncovered during continuous modes of operation, the company may need to 
perform analysis (including quantitative analysis such as LOPA or HRA) to more fully address 
any unresolved or complex issues raised in the hazard evaluation of non-routine modes of 
operation.   
 
Case studies presented later in this paper illustrate the analysis approach and the usefulness of 
this strategy.   
 
Purpose of Hazard Evaluation of Procedures-Based Modes of Operation 
 
Although incorporating human factors considerations into hazard evaluation studies of 
continuous operation is straightforward by asking why the human might make a mistake that 
leads to a parametric deviation, this approach only addresses a small fraction of the potential 
human errors that can affect process safety.  Many analysts have tried to find accident scenarios 
in non-routine modes of operations by adding generic guide words such as “deviations during 
startup” and “deviations during maintenance/sampling” to the hazard evaluation of equipment 
nodes/sections.  Unfortunately, this only catches a fraction of the accident scenarios that can 
occur in non-routine modes since a hazard evaluation team is focused on “continuous” mode of 
operation during HAZOP or What-if of equipment sections/nodes. 
 
From an informal survey of more than 100 companies, most do not currently perform process 
hazard evaluations of procedures, although many do perform some type of job safety analysis 
(JSA).  The JSA is an excellent starting point for an evaluation of procedures because a JSA 
 
identifies the tasks that workers  perform and the equipment required to protect workers from 
typical industrial hazards (slips, falls, cuts, burns, fumes, etc.).  Unfortunately, a typical JSA will 
not usually identify process safety issues or related human factors concerns.  For example, from 
a JSA perspective, it may be perfectly safe for an operator to open a steam valve before opening 
a feed valve; however, from a process safety perspective, the operator may need to open the feed 
valve before the steam valve to avoid the potential for overheating the reactor and initiating an 
exothermic decomposition.  The primary purpose of a JSA and other traditional methods for 
reviewing procedures has been to ensure that the procedures are accurate and complete (which is 
required of employers in 29 CFR 1910.119(f)(3)).6   
 
By contrast, the purpose of a hazard evaluation is not to ensure the procedures are accurate and 
acceptable, but instead, to evaluate the accident scenarios if the procedures are not followed.  
Even the best procedure may not be followed for any number of reasons, and these failures to 
follow the prescribed instructions can and do result in incidents.  In fact, in the chemical industry 
and most other process industries the chance of an operator or other worker making a mistake in 
following a procedure is greater than 1/100, and in some cases much greater.  When  taking into 
account common human factor deficiencies that accompany non-routine operations, such as 
fatigue, lack of practice, the rush to restart and return to full production, etc., the probability of 
errors can climb to 1/10 chances per task (a task being about 1 to 10 detailed steps).19   
 
 
Industry has found that a HAZOP or what-if analysis, structured to address procedures, can be 
used effectively for finding the great majority of accident scenarios that can occur during non-
routine modes of operation.3, 15, 20, 21 Experience shows that reviews of non-routine procedures 
have revealed many more hazards than merely trying to address these modes of operation during 
the P&ID driven hazard evaluations. 
 
Example:  For the BP Texas City, Texas refinery, pre-2005, if the isomerization unit had a 
hazard analysis of the startup mode (using What-If and 2-Guide Word analysis [explained later 
in this work]), the team would have likely identified that the high-high level switch in the column 
was a critical safety device.  They also may have recommended moving the switch to a location 
higher in the column and then interlocking the high-high level switch to shutdown feed to the 
column.  However, the site performed a parametric deviation HAZOP of the equipment nodes 
which focusing on continuous mode of operation, and so the team decided that the high-high 
level switch was not critical since devices in upstream and downstream process units (during 
continuous operation) would indicate possible level problems in the column – and besides, the 
operator would certainly notice the high-level condition on the sight glass during the rounds 
twice per shift.  Unfortunately, these are not necessarily safeguards during startup of the column 
(1) since the routine practice was to overfill the bottoms (raise the level above the upper tap of 
the level controllers transmitter and above the nozzle for the high-high level switch and (2) since 
The purpose of a hazard evaluation of non-routine modes of operation (governed by 
written procedures) is to make sure an organization has enough safeguards for the 
inevitable instance when a step is either performed wrong or skipped (inadvertently or 
due to shortcutting or other reasons) 
 
swings in upstream and downstream units are expected (and so likely such swings would not 
have led to intervention by the operators of the other units). 
 
To reinforce the need for and to explain the method for analysis of deviations of steps in a 
procedure, Section 9.1 was included in the 3rd Edition of Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation 
Procedures, 20083; this was one of the major changes to the hazard evaluation procedures.
 
HAZOP Method for Analyzing Deviations of Procedural Steps 
 
The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) method has two major variations; one for the continuous 
mode of operations (where the team brainstorms what would happen if there were deviations of 
parameters) and procedure-based (where the team brainstorms what would happen when the 
steps of a procedure are not followed correctly).  The procedure-based variation of HAZOP is the 
oldest form of HAZOP (from ICI in 1960s).22  It was an expansion of a Hazard Evaluation 
method based strictly on asking: 
• What happens if the step is skipped? 
• What happens if the step is performed wrong? 
 
In turn, the “pre-HAZOP” method for brainstorming accident scenarios from not following 
procedures (including because the procedure is itself wrong) is based on the understanding that 
human errors occur by someone not doing a step (errors of omission) or by doing a step 
incorrectly (errors of commission).  So, simply asking what would happen if the operator omitted 
a step or performed a step wrong is one way to structure a hazard evaluation of a step-by-step 
procedure.  (We will discuss the usefulness of this simple approach to hazard evaluation of steps 
later.) 
 
Seven (7) Guide Word Method  
 
In an effort to be more thorough, the inventors of HAZOP (at ICI) broke these two types of 
errors into subparts and agreed on using the following 7 Guide Words: 
 
Omission:  Skip (or Step Missing) 
Part Of 
 
Commission:  More 
Less  
Out of Sequence 




In the early 1990s, the guide word Skip was augmented by adding the option of discussing “are 
there any steps missing from the procedure.”15 
 
 
Table 1:  Definitions of 7-8 Guide Words for HAZOP of Procedure-Based (Non-Continuous 
Mode) Operation 
Guide Word Meaning When Applied to a Step 
Missing (optional 
guide word) 
A step or precaution is missing from the written procedure prior to this 
step (similar to “Out of Sequence”, except the missing step is not 
written) 
Skip (No, Not, 
Don’t) 
The specified intent of this step is not performed 
Part-of A portion of the full intent is not performed.  Usually only applies to a 
task that involves two or more nearly simultaneous actions (“Open 
valves A, B, and C”.) 
More Too much of the specified intent is done (does not apply to simple 
on/off; open/close functions); or it is performed too fast 
Less Too little of the intent is done, or it is performed too slowly 
Out of sequence This step is performed too early in the sequence 
As well as Something happens, or the user does another action, in addition to the 
specified step being done correctly (could be a short cut) 
Other than (or 
Reverse) 
The wrong device is operated, selected, read, etc., or operated in a way 
other than intended.  Or the wrong material is selected or added.  
“Other than” errors always imply a “Skip” as well. 
 
To apply HAZOP to procedural steps for startup, shutdown, online maintenance, and other 
modes of operation, the facilitator (or team)  first divides the procedure into individual actions. 
This is already done if there is only one action per step.  Then, the set of guide words or 
questions is systematically applied to each action of the procedure resulting in procedural 
deviations or what-if questions.  The guide words (or procedural deviation phrases) shown in 
Table 1 above were derived from HAZOP guide words commonly used for analysis of batch 
processes.  The definition of each guide word is carefully chosen to allow universal and thorough 
application to both routine batch and non-routine continuous and batch procedures.  The actual 
review team structure and meeting progression are nearly identical to that of a process equipment 
HAZOP or what-if analysis, except that active participation of one or more operators is even 
more important and usually requires two operators for a thorough review; a senior operator and a 
junior operator.  For each deviation from the intention of the process step (denoted by these 
guide words applied to the process step or action), the team needs to dig beyond the obvious 
cause, "operator error," to identify root causes associated with human error such as "inadequate 
emphasis on this step during training," “responsible for performing two tasks simultaneously,” 
"inadequate labeling of valves," or "instrument display confusing or not readable."  The guide 
word missing elicits causes such as "no written procedural step or formal training to obtain a hot 
work permit before this step," or "no written procedural step or formal training to open the 
discharge valve before starting the pump."  
 
Two (2) Guide Word Method for Analyzing Deviations of Procedural Steps 
 
A more streamlined guide word approach has also proven very useful for (1) procedures related 
to less hazardous operations and tasks and/or (2) when the leader has extensive experience in the 
use of the guide words mentioned previously and can therefore compensate for the weaknesses 
 
of a more streamlined approach.  The two guide words for this approach (as defined in Table 2 
below) encompass the basic human error categories:  errors of omission and commission.  These 
guide words are used in an identical way to the guide words introduced earlier.  Essentially 
"omit" includes the errors of omission related to the guide words "skip," "part of," and "missing" 
mentioned earlier.  The guide word "incorrect" incorporates the errors of commission related to 
the guide words "more," "less," "out of sequence," "as well as," and "other than" mentioned 
earlier.  Note that these two guide words (Table 2) fill the basic requirements for a human error 
analysis as outlined in OSHA's CPL 2-2.45.4 
 
Table 2:  2 Guide Word (Guide Phrases) for Modified-HAZOP of Procedure-Based 
Operation  
Guide Phrase Meaning When Applied to a Step 
Step not 
performed 
The step is not done or part of the step is not done.  Some possible reasons 
include the employee forgot to do the step, did not understand the importance 




The employee's intent was to perform the step (not omit the step), however, 
the step is not performed as intended.  Some possible reasons include the 
employee does too much or too little of stated task, the employee manipulates 





Table 3:  Example of 2 Guide Word HAZOP of a Critical Step in a Procedure 




Method: 2 Guide 

















Operator failing to block 
in one of the reactors, 
such as due to 
miscommunication 
between control room 
operator and field 
operator; or control valve 
sticking open or leaking 
through 
High pressure due to possible 
runaway reaction (because 
cooling is already lost), because 
of continued feeding of olefin 
(link to 11.7 - High Rxn Rate; 
HF Alky Reactor #1/#2) 
High pressure due to high level 
in the reactor, because of 
continued feeding olefin (link to 
11.1 - High Level;  HF Alky 
Reactor #1/#2) 
High temperature alarm on reactor 
High pressure alarm on reactor  
Field operator may notice sound of fluid 
flow across valve 
Flow indication (in olefin charge line to 
reactor that is inadvertently NOT 
shutdown) 
Level indicator, high level alarm, and 
independent high-high level 
switch/alarm 
 
Operator failing to make 
sure bypass valve is also 
closed, since this 
precaution is not listed in 
the written procedure; or 
the bypass valve leaks 
through 
High pressure due to possible 
runaway reaction (because 
cooling is already lost), because 
of continued feeding of olefin 
(link to 11.7 - High Rxn Rate; 
HF Alky Reactor #1/#2) 
High pressure due to high level 
in the reactor, because of 
continued feeding olefin (link to 
11.1 - High Level;  HF Alky 
Reactor #1/#2) 
High temperature alarm on reactor 
High pressure alarm on reactor  
Field operator skill training requires 
always checking bypasses are closed), 
when blocking in control valves 
Field operator may notice sound of fluid 
flow across valve 
Flow indication in olefin charge line 
(but likely not sensitive enough for 
small flows) 
Level indicator, high level alarm, and 
independent high-high level 
switch/alarm 
 
Operator failing to close 
low control valve 
Valve possibly opens full at 
restart, allowing too much flow 
Control room skill training requires 
always manually commanding 
37.  Implement 
best-practice 
 





Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendatio
n 
manually from the DCS 
because the phrase 
“block in” is used instead 
of the word “close” 
to reactor at restart, resulting in 
poor quality at startup and/or 
possibly resulting in runaway 
reaction and high pressure 
automatic valves closed before telling 













Operator closing the 
olefin charge flow 
control valves before 
shutting down the charge 
pump, primarily because 
the steps are written out 
of the proper sequence 
Deadheading of charge pump, 
leading to possible pump seal 
damage/failure and/or other leak, 
resulting in a fire hazard 
affecting a small area (link to 
5.12 - Loss of Containment; 
Olefin Charge Line/Pump) 
Step 3 of procedure that says to 
shutdown charge pump 
The step to shut down the charge pump 
(Step 3) is typically accomplished 
before Step 2 (in practice) 
41.  Move Step 3 
ahead of Step 2.   
Field operator closing 
both upstream and 
downstream block valves 
Possible trapping of liquid 
between block valve and control 
valve, leading to possible valve 
damage (due to thermal 
expansion) 
Field operator skill training stresses that 
only one block valve should be closed 
 
 
What-if Method for Analyzing Deviations of Procedural Steps 
 
The What-if method for analyzing procedure-based modes of operations is free brainstorming 
without the aid (or constraints) of guide words.  This method is described in detail the Guideline 
for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS)3.  The hazard evaluation team using this method 
would read the procedure and then answer the question: “What mistakes will lead to our 
consequences of interest?”  The team would list these mistakes and then brainstorm the full 
consequences, causes, and existing safeguards – the same analysis approach described for the 
guide word approaches mentioned earlier in this section.  What-if brainstorming is not applied to 
each step of the procedure, but rather covers the entire task (procedure) at one time. 
 
Choosing the Right Method for Analysis of Non-Routine Modes of Operation 
 
Obviously the What-if approach takes far less time than the 2-Guide Word method, and the 2 
Guide Word method takes much less time than the 7-8 Guide Word method of HAZOP of 
procedures.  Experience has shown that hazard evaluation facilitators, newly trained in the three 
techniques above, tend to overwork an analysis of non-routine procedures, so a tiered approach is 
best. In this tiered approach, the first step in choosing the right method of analysis in the hazard 
evaluation of procedures is to screen the procedures and select only those procedures with 
extreme hazards.  These procedures should be subjected to a detailed HAZOP analysis (7-8 
guide word set) presented above.  The 2-Guide Word set is efficiently used for less complex 
tasks or where the consequences are lower.  The What-if method is applicable to low hazard, low 
complexity, or very well understood tasks/hazards.   
  
Experience of the leader or the team plays a major part in selecting the procedures to be 
analyzed, and then in deciding when to use each guide word set. 
 
Figure 2 shows the typical usage of the three methods described above for a typical set of 
operations procedures within a complex chemical plant or refinery or other process/ operation.  
Most of the procedures are simple enough, or have low enough hazards to warrant using the 
What-if method.  Currently, the 7-8 Guide Word approach is used infrequently, since most tasks 







Figure 2.  Relative Usage of Techniques 
for Analysis of Procedure-Based Modes 
of Operation  
 
The experience of the leader or the team plays a major part in selecting the method to use for 
each task/procedures to be analyzed.  However the first decision will always be “Are these 
procedures ready to be risk reviewed?”  If the procedures are up-to-date, complete, clear, and 
used by operators, then the best approach for completing a complete hazard evaluation of All 











































If your procedures are not at least 90% accurate, then the best approach is to develop 
accurate and up-to-date procedures as quickly as possible and afterwards do a PHA of the 
newly issued procedures.   
 
Any procedure (even a computer program) can be analyzed using these techniques.  Reviews of 
routine procedures are important, but reviews of non-routine procedures are even more 
important.  As mentioned earlier, the nature of non-routine procedures means that operators have 
much less experience performing them, and many organizations do not regularly update these 
procedures [though this should change as companies comply with 29 CFR 1910.119(f)]6.  Also, 
during non-routine operations, many of the standard equipment safeguards or interlocks are off 
or bypassed. 
Many companies do not perform a thorough analysis of the risk for startup, shutdown, and on-
line maintenance modes of operation; the reason normally given is that the analysis of these 
modes of operation takes “too long.”  Yet, actually, the hazard evaluation of the normal mode is 
taking too long and so the organization feels it has no time left for the analysis of procedures for 
startup and shutdown modes of operation.  But, if these hazard evaluations for the normal mode 
of operation are optimized (such as using rules presented elsewhere23), the organization will 
have time for thoroughly analyzing the non-routine modes (typically discontinuous modes) of 
operation and the organization will still have a net savings overall!  This point is critical since 
60-75% of catastrophic accidents occur during non-routine modes of operation.  Figure 4 
illustrates (for a continuous process unit) the typical split of meeting time for analysis of routine 

















Figure 4.  Relative Amount of Meeting Time Spent for Analysis of Routine and Non-
routine Modes of Operation for a Continuous Process 
Using the approaches above, a company doing a complete hazard evaluation of an 
existing unit will invest about 65% of their time to evaluate normal (e.g., continuous 
mode) operation and 35% of their time for evaluating the risks of non-routine modes of 
operation. 
 
General Guidelines for Analyzing Non-routine Modes of Operation or Batch (Step-by-step) 
Processes 
 
• Define the assumptions about the system's initial status.  “What is assumed to be the 
starting conditions when the user of the procedure begins with Step 1?” 
• Define the complete design intention for each step.  “Is the step actually 3 or 5 actions 
instead of one action?  If so, what are the individual actions to accomplish this task?” 
• Don’t analyze safeguard steps that start with ensure, check, verify, inspect, etc., or where 
the consequence of skip is “loss of one level of safeguard/protection against …..” There is no 
reason to analyze these steps since they will show up as safeguards of deviations of other steps.  
This approach is similar to not analyzing a PSV during a HAZOP of continuous mode 
(parametric deviation analysis); instead the PSV is shown as a safeguard against loss of 
containment. 
• Together with an operator before the meeting, identify the sections of the procedures that 
warrant use of: 
o 7-8 Guide Words (extremely large consequences can happen if deviations occur) 
o 2 Guide Words (the system is complex, mistakes are costly, or several consequences 
could occur) 
o On others, use What-If (no guide words or guide phrases; for use on simpler or lower 
hazard systems) 
• Decompose each written step into a sequence of actions (verbs) 
• Apply guide words directly to the intentions of each action 
 
The Following Preparation Steps May Also Be Needed: 
 
• Walk through procedure in the plant with one or more operators to see the work situation 
and verify the accuracy of the written procedure.  This is optional and should have also been 
performed as part of validation of the procedure after it was originally drafted. 
• Determine if the procedure follows the best practices for “presentation” of the content; 
the best practices will limit the probability of human error. 
• Discuss generic issues related to operating procedures, such as: 
o staffing (normal and temporary) 
o human-machine interface 
o worker training, certification, etc. 
o management of change 
o policy enforcement 




PII and others have perhaps tens of thousands of PHAs, including many thousands of PHAs of 
all modes of operation.  Everyone who applies the lessons above find hundreds to thousands of 
scenarios that are unique to startup, shutdown, and online maintenance.   For example: 
 
Results from thousands of PHAs of non-routine modes of operation indicates that about 3% to 
6% of the relief valves across the industry have been discovered to be too small and so had to be 
 
resized to account for accident scenarios that were only found during analysis of non-routine 
modes of operation. 
 
The following case studies illustrate the usefulness of the process outlined in this paper.   
 
Case Study 1:  Phillips Polyethylene Plant 6, Pasadena, Texas 
 
In 1991-1992, a PHA was performed for the first of the rebuilt polyethylene plants at the 
Pasadena, TX, Phillips 66 plant.  The accident there two years prior claimed 24 lives, injured 
hundreds of others, destroyed all three polyethylene plants, and cost Phillips an estimated $1.4 
billion.  Following the investigation of the accident, one of the requirements of the settlement 
agreement between Phillips and the US government was to ensure the PHA of the rebuilt units 
addressed hazards during All modes of operation.  
 
The PHA team varied in size, but always included at least two operators.  The team leader was a 
process engineer with 15 years of experience, who was also trained in human factors.  The PHA 
first covered the continuous mode of operation for the approximately 200 nodes of equipment 
(from feed stock through pellet handling) using the “parametric deviation” form of HAZOP (and 
some What-If).  Then, to complete the analysis of all modes of operation, the PHA team 
performed a step-by-step analysis of all steps of all startup and shutdown and online maintenance 
procedures (about 700 steps changed the state of the system and each of these steps were 
analyzed) using the 7 Guide Word HAZOP method (2 Guide Word analysis was not known to 
the team at this time).  For deviations such as “operator skips a step,” the causes identified by the 
team included "the operator doing this step miscommunicates with the operator who performed 
steps earlier in the day and went to the wrong reset panel/switch in the field".  In this example, an 
"other-than" error led to the "skip" error; so two errors occurred at once: the wrong switch was 
flipped and the correct switch was not flipped.  Other causes included:  “label not distinct 
enough” or “thinking/believing the previous operator completed this step.”  The additional 
safeguards suggested by the PHA team sometimes lower the likelihood of the error by addressing 
a human factors weakness.  But in many cases, the solution was a change to the hardware or 
instrumentation, including adding new interlocks (these would be called Safety Instrumented 
Functions today) and adding mechanical interlocks and installing larger relief valves.  In a 
couple of cases, isolated sections of the process were redesigned to lower the inherent risk, such 
as adding error-proofing (Poke Yoka) features. 
 
The 7 Guide Word HAZOP of non-routine modes of operation took 2.5 weeks of meetings, 40 
hours a week.  This was in addition to the 3.5 weeks of meetings to complete the parametric 
deviation analysis HAZOP of the continuous (normal) mode of operation (as mentioned before, 
200 nodes of equipment).  Note that if the team had known of and been trained in 2 Guide Word 
HAZOP for procedure steps, they likely would have chosen that for many of the tasks and it is 
estimated that the meeting time for analysis of non-routine procedures would have been reduced 
to less than 2 weeks, with little or no loss of thoroughness. The completed PHA report was 
submitted to US OSHA for review and was approved almost immediately; OSHA particularly 
reviewed the analysis of all modes of operation and coverage of human factors. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Typical Settling Leg Assembly for 
Phillips Polyethylene Reactor 
 
After the PHA was completed, the 
settlement agreement also required a 
quantified human reliability analysis 
(HRA) of the online maintenance task of 
clearing a plugged settling leg – mistakes 
during this task led to the accident in 1989.  
The HRA was performed similar to those 
performed for nuclear reactor risk 
assessments, using a human reliability 
event tree to model the error probability for 
the task.  The HRA results indicated that if 
the three IPLs in the new design are 
maintained, the probability of a similar 
event occurring when using this procedure 
was less than the risk of fatality when 
driving to work.  This report was also 
approved by OSHA for settlement 
purposes.    
 
The HRA shed light on new aspects of 
making errors and recovering from the 
errors during this task, but the HRA results 
did not result in changes to the process 
steps (at least not much), or the training 
program, or the human factors engineering, 
or the hardware/IPLs.   
 
In this instance, the HRA validated the results of the 7 Guide Word HAZOP, but did not make 
new recommendations.  The HAZOP of the procedures had already found the major accident 
scenarios and had already identified well enough the changes needed to reach tolerable risk. 
 
 Case Study 2:  SAFCO (SABIC) Urea and Ammonia Plants in the Arabian Gulf Region  
 
Several ammonia and urea plants had hazard evaluations performed using HAZOP of nodes 
(parametric deviations for continuous mode of operation) and then non-routine modes of 
operation were analyzed using What-if and 2-Guide Word analysis for selected, critical 
procedures.  The HAZOP of nodes (which focuses necessarily on the continuous mode of 
operation) missed many accident scenarios that were later found during review of non-routine 
modes of operation.  The analysis of critical procedures resulted in a number of new 
recommendations to reduce the risk of accident scenarios (these accident scenarios were not 
identified during the HAZOP of the nodes a few days before).  One example was the 
recommendation to install a second, independent level transmitter on the urea reactor to prevent 
overflow to the high pressure scrubber which will lead to overpressure of the entire synthesis 
loop and poor reaction kinetics during startup and normal operation.   
 
 
Another example related to the start-up of high pressure ammonia pumps in the synthesis section 
of the ammonia plant follows.  A recommendation was made during the analysis to include more 
detail on the required rate of temperature increase together with notes explaining the potential 
consequences for heating too quickly.  In this case, a high heating rate may damage the 316L 
stainless steel liner in vessels and would have caused corrosion, deformation and ultimately a 
vessel failure.   
 
It was also identified during the analysis that the development of trouble-shooting guides should 
be considered for responding to severe system upsets, including control valve failure, sticking of 
a hand valves, and to address contamination issues.  These can be developed with the help of the 
PHA tables, which contain 40% of the scenarios and information related to trouble-shooting 
guides.   
 
Case Study 3:  SINOPEC-SABIC Tianjin Petrochemical Company (SSTPC)   
 
The process plants at SS-TPC currently are: 
• Ethylene (ET) 
• MTBE & Butadiene (BD/MTBE) 
• Phenol/Acetone (PHAC) 
• High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) 
• Linear Low Density Polyethylene (LLDPE) 
• Polypropylene (PP) 
• Pyrolysis Gasoline (DPG) 
• Ethylene Oxide & Ethylene Glycol (EO/EG)  
• Tank farm and Storage 
• Utilities 
 
PII led the PHA of the units, for all modes of operation.  Besides a HAZOP or What-if of 
continuous modes of operation, the PHA team also used the Two Guideword or What-if 
approach to complete a PHA of startup, shutdown, and online maintenance modes of operation.  
The PHA of the non-routine modes of operation took about 25% of the total meeting time and 
was done at the end of the unit node-by-node analysis for continuous mode of operation.   
 
Hundreds of scenarios were found during analysis of procedure-based modes of operation, 
resulting in many recommendations that had not been found during PHA of normal mode of 
operation.  These resulted in implementation of new instrumentation and permissives and 




Qualitative analysis of non-routine operating procedures is an extremely powerful tool for 
uncovering deficiencies that can lead to human errors and for uncovering accident scenarios 
during all modes of operation.  This approach of step-by-step HAZOP and/or What-If analysis is 
not new to industry, and regulators have required similar approaches for decades.  And regulators 
continue to note lack of analysis of the risk of non-routine operations and lack of risk review of 
changes to procedures. 
 
 
From the Wall Street Journal24 referencing the presidential commission investigating the 
Deepwater Horizon accident of April 2010:  BP had rules in place governing procedural 
changes, but its workers didn't consistently follow them, according to BP's September [2010] 
internal report on the disaster and the report released earlier this month [January 2011] by the 
presidential commission on the accident.  "Such decisions appear to have been made by the BP 
Macondo team in ad hoc fashion without any formal risk analysis or internal expert review," the 
commission's report said. "This appears to have been a key causal factor of the blowout."24 
 
From CSB Report on August 2008 Bayer CropScience Explosion: 13 “The accident occurred 
during the startup of the methomyl unit, following a lengthy period of maintenance … CSB 
investigators also found the company failed to perform a thorough Process Hazard Analysis, or 
PHA, as required by regulation…In particular, for operational tasks that depend heavily on task 
performance and operator decisions, the team should analyze the procedures step-by-step to 
identify potential incident scenarios and their consequences, and to determine if the protections 
in place are sufficient.” 
 
More regulatory pressure is sure to follow, since major accidents continue to occur during 
non-routine modes of operation. 
 
Regardless of what hazard evaluation technique is employed, it is imperative for PHA teams to 
ask, "Why would someone make this mistake?" whenever a human error is identified as a cause 
of a potential accident.  "To err is human" may be a true statement, but the frequency and 
consequences of such errors can be effectively reduced with a well-designed strategy for 
analyzing risk of non-routine operating modes. 
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